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Abstract
Background: A loss of adequate Situation Awareness (SA) may play a major role in the genesis of critical incidents
in anesthesia and critical care. This observational study aimed to determine the frequency of SA errors in cases of a
critical incident reporting system (CIRS).
Methods: Two experts independently reviewed 200 cases from the German Anesthesia CIRS. For inclusion, reports
had to be related to anesthesia or critical care for an individual patient and take place in an in-hospital setting.
Based on the SA framework, the frequency of SA errors was determined. Representative cases were analyzed
qualitatively to illustrate the role of SA for decision-making.
Results: SA errors were identified in 81.5 %. Predominantly, errors occurred on the levels of perception (38.0 %) and
comprehension (31.5 %). Errors on the level of projection played a minor role (12.0 %). The qualitative analysis of
selected cases illustrates the crucial role of SA for decision-making and performance.
Conclusions: SA errors are very frequent in critical incidents reported in a CIRS. The SA taxonomy was suitable to
provide mechanistic insights into the central role of SA for decision-making and thus, patient safety.
Keywords: Situation awareness, Patient safety, Human error analysis, Accident analysis, Anesthesia and
perioperative care, Critical care
Background
Accurate Situation Awareness (SA) is the indispensable
precursor for correct decision-making and action [1–3].
Therefore, it is likely that errors frequently evolve from
incorrect SA. Endsley defined SA as “the perception of
elements of the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the
projection of their status in the near future” [4]. In
anesthesia and critical care, the first and lowest level of
SA is the perception of information that is provided by
the patient (e.g., through verbal communication or ap-
pearance), monitors, patient charts, communication
within the team, anesthesia machine, respirators, and the
surgical field (perception, SA level I) [1]. On the second
level, information is processed in order to comprehend
the patient’s state (comprehension, SA level II). On the
third and highest level, health care providers estimate
how the patient will develop in the next minutes and
hours (projection, SA level III). Generating SA on this
level is challenging but important since it allows for pro-
active management of human and material resources
during crisis. To also cover team processes, the frame-
work has been extended defining team SA as “the degree
to which every team member possesses the SA required
for his or her responsibilities” [5].
Endsley suggested a taxonomy that differentiates be-
tween different types of errors on each of the three SA
levels (Table 1) [6]. In SA level I (perception) errors, rele-
vant information was not perceived (e.g., damaged or
missing monitoring equipment as well as communica-
tion problems within the health care team can limit the
information necessary for adequate SA of an individual).
Errors on SA level II (comprehension) occur if a
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complete set of information is not processed correctly
resulting in imperfect comprehension of the situation.
Errors on the SA level III (projection) take place if a situ-
ation is well understood but the future development is
estimated falsely. This error taxonomy has previously
been used successfully to systematically analyze inci-
dents in aviation [6, 7].
Similar to the Aviation Safety Reporting System, vol-
untary Critical Incident Reporting Systems (CIRS) have
been introduced into anesthesia in several European
countries in the last fifteen years [8]. CIRS offer individ-
uals an anonymous platform to report errors and near
misses. In a review article, Mahajan emphasized that a
systematic analysis of each report is a prerequisite for
changes in daily practice [9]. For the purpose of a sys-
tematic analysis of errors and error mitigation, error
classification [10, 11] and reporting [12, 13] systems
have been developed and applied. However, none of
them specifically addressed SA errors as a potentially
important underpinning mechanism.
Therefore, we determined the frequency of SA errors on
the particular SA levels in 200 CIRS cases in anesthesia
and critical care. Additionally, a sample of CIRS cases was
analyzed qualitatively according to the SA error taxonomy
in order to illustrate how SA errors can be associated with
wrong decisions, potentially harming the patient.
Methods
Study design
After approval of the Research Ethics Board (Technische
Universität München, 5770/13, 26th of April, 2013), 200
cases from the German Anesthesia CIRS were analyzed
by two independent experts (VK and CS). According to
the nature of CIRS, informed consent could not be ob-
tained as the involved individuals remain anonymous.
To minimize selection bias, the cases (dating from April
to November 2013) were selected in strict consecutive
order. For inclusion, a case had to deal with an individ-
ual patient and had to be in-hospital and related to
anesthesia or critical care. Some reports described gen-
eral, e.g., structural problems or commented on compro-
mised safety of health care staff. Although the problems
described in those cases may significantly impact SA on
the level of both individuals and teams, they were ex-
cluded as the cases were beyond one individual’s SA and
actions. If a case met the inclusion criteria, the experts
determined the SA level on which the error occurred as
described below.
Data acquisition
The CIRS used for this study is operated by the German
Society of Anesthesiology and Intensive Care Medicine
(DGAI), the Agency for Quality in Medicine (ÄZQ) and
the Alliance of German Anesthesiologists (BDA). Any
health care provider can access the platform without re-
strictions for both reporting and looking through pub-
lished reports. The reporters are invited to describe
critical incidents and near misses. Prior to publication,
trained personnel carefully checks every report for ano-
nymity and content in order to avoid blaming language
as well as any possibility to trace back to the persons in-
volved in the case. In this step, also any information and
judgment that appears unrelated or unimportant is
deleted.
Users report the content of the case in a narrative style
of varying length. A part from that, the users can pro-
vide data about location (anesthesia, post-anesthesia care
unit, intensive care unit, in-hospital transports, code
blue team, acute pain management, premedication,
other), time point (working day vs. weekend), estimated
frequency of this kind of incident (almost daily, weekly,
monthly, several times a year, seldom, only this time),
professional status of the reporting health care provider
(physician, nurse, paramedic, other), his or her work ex-
perience (more or less than 5 years), routine vs. emer-
gency case, ASA-classification and whether any medical
device was involved. This was recorded to investigate
whether the presence and level of SA errors depended
on the above-mentioned categorical variables.
Analysis of CIRS cases for identification of SA errors
In the first step, the critical action of an individual in a case
(e.g., the administration of wrong drug, or the absence of
an action that would have resolved the problem) was iden-
tified. Then, based on the framework of the anesthetist’s SA
Table 1 Endsley’s taxonomy of Situation Awareness errors
SA level I Fail to perceive or misperception of information
1.1 Data was not available
1.2 Data was hard to discriminate or detect (e.g., visual barrier)
1.3 Failure to monitor or observe data
1.4 Misperception of data
1.5 Memory loss
SA level II Improper integration or comprehension of information
2.1 Lack or incomplete mental model
2.2 Use of incorrect mental model
2.3 Over-reliance on default values
SA level III Incorrect projections of future trends
3.1 Lack or incomplete mental model
3.2 Over-projection of current trends
On each of the levels, errors can occur and SA may be inaccurate, incomplete
or even wrong [6]. In SA level I (perception) errors information may be
unavailable, hard to detect, is perceived incorrectly (although presented
correctly), is not observed due to inadequate distribution of attention or
simply forgotten. As mental models, automaticity and pattern matching
abilities develop over time, individual lack of experience may contribute to a
limited capability of adequate and quick information processing resulting in
SA level II and III errors
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and Endsley’s definition of SA errors [1, 6], the experts ana-
lyzed whether inadequate SA was associated with the deci-
sion leading to that action (or non-action, respectively).
This required a yes/no response by the experts. If a SA
error occurred, also the level (perception vs. comprehension
vs. projection) on which the error occurred was determined.
If errors occurred on various levels and were related to each
other, the experts assigned the error to the most basic level,
e.g., pulse oximetry was not used and a health care provider
did not comprehend that the patient was desaturating. In
this scenario, the causing error was on the level of percep-
tion and therefore, only this error was coded. If various SA
errors occurred independently from each other, the experts
only coded the error, which was directly associated with the
critical action. The experts analyzed each case independ-
ently. If the experts disagreed with respect to the occur-
rence of a SA error or the level on which the error
occurred, the respective case was turned back to the ex-
perts for independent re-evaluation. If there remained diffi-
culties to assign the cases to a SA level, consensus was
obtained after mutual discussion between three of the
authors (CS, VK, KW).
With the aim of illustrating each type of error accord-
ing to the taxonomy described above, we identified cases
that were detailed enough for an analysis of types of er-
rors of the specific SA levels. Each case was translated
into English, followed by a brief qualitative analysis in
terms of the SA framework and an assignment of the
underlying types of error. Additionally, three cases are
described where SA was lost and re-gained or where
active efforts to gain SA prevented a patient from dam-
age in a rapidly changing situation.
Statistical analysis
The intended number of 200 included cases permitted to
estimate the frequency of a certain case with an accuracy of
at least 7 %, which is the confidence interval for the esti-
mated relative frequency. Furthermore, even rare events
with a frequency of 1.5 % will be detected at a likelihood of
95 %. Frequencies of SA errors, the respective SA levels and
the results of error classification are given as percentage.
For an exploratory analysis of correlations between SA er-
rors and categorical data, cross-tables were used with either
Chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test when tables contained
values of 5 or less. Reliability was calculated using Cohen’s
kappa based on the initial assessment of the experts.
P-values < 0.05 were considered statistically significant. All
statistical analysis was done with IBM SPSS Statistics
Version 22.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, New York, USA).
Results
Frequency of SA errors
248 cases had to be tested for inclusion criteria in order
to extract 200 cases that were reviewed by the experts
(Fig. 1). 77.5 % of cases were routine cases whereas 21 %
were considered to be emergency situations (1.5 % non
defined). 24.5 % of cases were reported as singular
events, 38.0 % as seldom, 19 % occurred several times a
year. The remaining cases (18.5 %) were reported to
occur at least monthly. 82.5 % of cases were reported by
Fig. 1 Flow chart. Of 248 cases reviewed, 80.6 % met inclusion criteria. The majority was attributable to anaesthesia (51.5 %), whereas cases on
ICU (18.0 %) and PACU (6.0 %) were less frequent. The remaining 49 cases (24.5 %) occurred in locations such as during transports, in code blue
teams, during premedication visit or acute pain management. (CIRS = Critical incident reporting system, ICU = intensive care unit, PACU = post-
anaesthesia care unit)
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physicians with 27.9 % of them having less than 5 years
of experience. 14.0 % of cases were reported by nurses
(with only 10.7 % of them having less than 5 years of ex-
perience). Median of ASA score was 2.
SA errors were identified in 163 cases (81.5 %). The
large majority was attributed to the levels of perception
and comprehension (Fig. 2). Both experts agreed in 90 %
of cases whether an SA error was present or not
(Cohen’s kappa 0.69). With respect to the level on which
the error occurred, agreement was present in 66.9 %
(Cohen’s kappa 0.48) of cases.
Cross tables revealed that the frequency of SA errors
and the level on which they occurred were independent
from the location (anesthesia, ICU, PACU, other/not
specified) and from other categorical data (time point,
estimated frequency, professional status, work experi-
ence, routine vs. emergency case, ASA-classification and
whether a medical device was involved into the incident
[data not shown]).
Qualitative analysis of SA errors
In the following, cases with SA errors are described (see
Table 2 for details). Case 1 refers to information that
was either missing due to insufficient communication or
that was simply forgotten. Cases 2–4 are examples of
barriers that physically preclude from information to be-
come (acoustic and visual) sensory input (e.g., “After
putting the drapes, the access to both peripheral iv lines
was hampered”). In case 3, specifically, “small fonts” on
a display prevented from a more timely recognition of
the fact that a propofol syringe pump ran with
remifentanil and vice versa. In case 5, relevant informa-
tion was missed due to the decision not to use a patient
monitor. Case 6 describes the misperception of drug la-
bels resulting in the decision to use hydroxyethyl starch
to keep open an arterial line. The reporting individual
identified a look-alike problem of drugs (“both look
similar”) which is a problem addressed extensively else-
where [14]. In these cases (1–6), the involved individuals
did not perceive relevant information and consequently,
they did not comprehend important aspects of the situ-
ation and, as a result, wrong or no decisions were made.
In cases 7–12 the information was complete but proc-
essed incorrectly. In case 7, a health care provider was
not familiar with the operating mode of a pump, never-
theless he operated the pump and unintentionally ad-
ministered a bolus. A similar problem occurred in the
cases 8 and 9 where drugs were administered in the
wrong way. In SA terms, incorrect mental models were
applied. Cases 10 and 11 illustrate incomplete compre-
hension of a situation due to the over-reliance on default
values. In case 10 an anesthesiologist incorrectly as-
sumed that a syringe was ready to use. In case 11 the
drugs were prepared as usual in spite of a drug order
that differed considerably from routine. In case 12, pre-
sumably, the anesthesiologist was aware that a lobec-
tomy was to be performed using stapler technique.
Nevertheless, he had introduced the suction catheter
into the tracheal lumen of the tube. These two points
were not brought together, as this set of information did
not fit into preformed long-term memory content indi-
cating a lack of a mental model.
Cases 13 and 14 provide examples of how anesthesiol-
ogists unexpectedly are confronted with a problem or a
deterioration of the patient, indicating incomplete
awareness on the level of projection. In case 15, a team
member (a student) did not inform the rest of the team
about his situation awareness (SA level I and II) with re-
spect to a patient in the emergency department. As a re-
sult, not every team member possessed the SA needed
for her/his responsibilities (Team SA).
In contrast, the cases 16–18 (Table 3) illustrate how
the search for additional information and continuous re-
evaluation of the situation is crucial to maintain SA. In
case 16, an additional routine check of basic data pre-
vents a transfusion incident whereas in case 17, a situ-
ation (esophageal intubation) is not comprehended until
additional information (bronchoscopy) is sought and
processed. Case 18 is an example of a situation in course
of a transport of a patient for computed tomography
where the basic information changes very quickly and in
an unexpected manner. The persons involved were able
to dynamically adapt their SA and this enabled them to
make the right decisions in face of at least two life-
threatening problems.
Fig. 2 Distribution of SA errors on the levels perception, comprehension
and projection
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Table 2 Fifteen examples of SA errors
Case
number
Case description Analysis from the SA perspective SA level
1 An anesthesiologist took over a patient who had undergone
massive transfusion including catecholamine therapy. He reports
to have received a “detailed handover” and that his job was to
finish the procedure and to transport the patient to ICU. Just
before leaving the OR he replaced an empty infusion bag with a
new one in order to continue volume replacement. Immediately
afterwards, the patient’s suffered from ventricular arrhythmia and
the systolic blood pressure increased to 250 mmHg. “During check
of the i.v.-lines I noticed that the adrenaline syringe pump had been
connected to the central line by two extension lines type
Heidelberger. Obviously they had filled with highly concentrated
adrenaline which was administered unintentionally during volume
resuscitation.”
The anesthesiologist was not aware about a
significant amount of adrenaline in the lines. Possibly,
the hand-over, which he felt to be “detailed”, did not
include information about this fact (SA-I). Alterna-
tively, he may have forgotten this information in face
of a complex situation where gaining complete SA in
short time is challenging for someone who had not
been involved until this moment.
SA I
data not
available or
memory loss
2 “The code blue physician does not hear the beeper. The beeper turns
off after a certain time. The causes are a significant noise exposure
on the ICU and the high frequency of phone calls.”
The code blue physician did not perceive the alarm
(SA-I). The reporting individual mentions acoustic
barriers on one hand and high workload on the
other hand as causes.
SA I
hard to detect
3 “For economic reasons, sometimes, nurses program the syringe
pumps. In this case a syringe pump programmed for propofol ran
with remifentanil and, accordingly, it ran too slow. […] The only
striking point was that we had propofol in the remifentanil line
repeatedly and despite high infusion rates, we still had the first
syringe of remifentanil after hours. Having a closer look we were
able to recognize propofol in small fonts on the display whereas
remifentanil was indicated on the syringe label.”
It largely remains unclear why the nurse allocated the
drugs incorrectly. Assumingly some information
(syringe content or pump program) has been
forgotten. However, the reporting individual clearly
states that important information was displayed in
small fonts hindering a fast and quick recognition of
the content of syringe pumps (SA-I).
SA I
data hard to
discriminate
4 “After putting the drapes, the access to both peripheral iv lines was
hampered. During team-time-out one of the surgeon leant against
the arm compressing the iv lines while the anesthesiologist paged
through the patient’s health record […] so that the anesthetics en-
tered the infusion bag of the crystalloids. During skin incision the pa-
tient showed increase of heart rate and moved the arms. Then, we
switched the administration of anesthetics to the other iv access.”
Important visual information from iv lines
(obstruction) was not perceived due to a visual
barrier (drapes). Furthermore, the visual attention was
directed to the patient’s health record during team
time out. It remains speculative why a non-return
valve had not been used and whether the use of
such a valve had resulted e.g., in high-pressure alarms
in the syringe pumps (SA-I).
SA I
hard to detect
and failure to
observe
5 After uneventful anaesthesia the patient was transferred to
another location. There, the first systolic blood pressure assessed
was 60 mmHg. “In this OR a transport monitor does not exist. The
short transfer regularly is done without monitoring. Every time a
monitor is required, we have to get it from elsewhere which is time-
intensive.”
The case reveals structural problems as a monitoring
device is not easily available and the
anesthesiologists avoid time delays in face of
assumingly uncomplicated cases. As a result,
important information is missed (SA-I).
SA I
failure to
monitor
6 “To keep open an arterial line, HES [hydroxyethyl starch] was used
instead of saline. Both look similar but HES is an emergency
substance so that it should be stored in a different place.”
As both infusions look similar (look-alike problem),
the information was correct but obviously
misperceived (SA-I).
SA I
misperception
7 “A patient is transferred to ICU with several syringe pumps including
a pump for TIVA [total intravenous anaesthesia] that had been
equipped with a catecholamine. The ICU personnel are not familiar
with that type of pumps. […] Unintentionally, the patient got a
high bolus.”
A health care provider works with a syringe pump he
is not familiar with. Although all the dynamic
information is present (rates, drugs, indication), the
individual applies an incorrect mental model of the
pump’s operating mode and thus, he lacks of
comprehension (SA-II).
SA II
use of incorrect
mental model
8 “two oral drugs […] had been given via the central venous line
instead of the gastric tube.”
Assumingly, all the relevant information (e.g., package
insert, drug orders) was present, but the individual
lacks of a mental model with respect to how these
drugs are administered (SA-II). As a result he does not
comprehend that these drugs have to be
administered in another way.
SA II
use of incorrect
mental model
9 “[…] On the third postoperative day […] the epidural was stopped.
On the next morning, the anesthetist cannot visit the patients due
to concurrent obligations. During the evening visit, the anesthetist
noticed that ropivacaine was re-started but that it was connected to
a peripheral venous line. The infusion was stopped immediately.”
Assumingly, all the relevant basic information was
present: drug, patient and indication (SA-I). But the
information was not properly integrated, due to
missing knowledge or the use of missing or an
incorrect mental model (SA-II). If someone is
confronted with a set of information he can’t process
due to missing contextual contents in the long-term
memory, he will probably ask for assistance. If an in-
correct model is used, he won’t recognize the error
SA II
use of incorrect
mental model
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Table 2 Fifteen examples of SA errors (Continued)
as long as there is no additional information such as
visible adverse effects.
10 "During TIVA a change of the syringe (remifentanil) was pending.
The syringe had been prepared by the nurse (50 ml, clear solution).
The label “remifentanil” and the ampoule lied besides the syringe.
The nurse told to the anesthesiologist that the remifentanil syringe
was prepared. The anesthesiologist changed the syringe; in the
following minutes, the patient shows tachycardia and high blood
pressure, deepening anaesthesia is without success. When the nurse
came back, she asked if the anesthesiologist had added the
remifentanil to the prepared syringe. As it turned out, the
communication […] was unclear and stated a potential danger for
the patient.”
The anesthesiologist incorrectly assumed a syringe to
be correctly prepared (SA-II). Visible information (the
ampoule next to the syringe) was not perceived or
not integrated in order to come to the conclusion
that the syringe contained purely saline. Additionally,
the reporting individual identified a lack of
information resulting from unclear communication as
the cause.
SA II
over-reliance on
default values
11 “A critically ill patient with complex pains, who was visited by pain
physicians for 4-fold analgetic medication. During change of syringe
pump, ketamine is administered in wrong dosage, 50 mg/ml instead
of 1 mg/ml is administered, as it is usual for sedation. During shift
change the error is recognized. […] The patient was awake through-
out the case […] but suffered from headache.”
The nurse who changed the syringe prepared the
dosage as usual (assuming standard values), despite
differing information from the medication order as
indicated through the fact that this was recognized
during shift change. This may have happened
through an over-reliance on default values (SA-II) al-
though additional information was available that
would have resulted in a different action (preparing
the correct dosage).
SA II
over-reliance on
default values
12 “During thoracic surgery (VATS lobectomy) the suction catheter was
introduced too deep in the tracheal part of the double-lumen tube.
[…] Lobectomy is performed using a stapler. The suction catheter
could not be removed for checking for leakiness […]. As a cause, the
stapler had fixed the suction catheter. An anterior thoracotomy was
performed […] and the suction catheter was removed successfully.”
The anesthesiologist, assumingly, was aware about
the surgical procedure to be performed (use of
stapler). Additionally he had the information about
the suction catheter as he himself had inserted it.
This information has not been integrated properly as
he relied on his experience from prior situations
where removing the device was always without
problems and long-term memory content such as a
mental model or prototypical situations suited to suc-
cessfully integrate the basic data was not used or not
present. As a result, also a problem on the level of
projection emerges as an anterior thoracotomy had
to be performed unexpectedly.
SA II
lack of or
incomplete
mental model
13 “A surgeon indicated emergency surgery. There is no written
information about patient history and it is impossible to get the
information orally [from the patient]. The patient is assessed
clinically, an old scar from tracheostomy is visible which indicates
possible intubation problems. The anesthesiologist put himself under
pressure and induces anaesthesia without investigating the
background or consulting the admitting hospital. A rapid sequence
induction is performed. Intubation with a 8.0 size tube is not
possible, bag mask ventilation works, a 7.0 mm is not introducible
as well, and a laryngeal mask (4 and 5) is not tight so that
adequate ventilation is impossible. Finally, another physician
successfully intubates.”
Unexpectedly, the anesthesiologist ran into
intubation difficulties, indicating an error on the SA
level of projection (SA-III). This is supported by the
retrospective statement that he worked under
avoidable time pressure and that, as a consequence,
search for additional information was omitted (SA-I).
Regardless of the fact whether the simple presence
of a scar from tracheostomy should prompt the
preparation for difficult airway management, a
mental model that integrates the basic data
(tracheostomy in the past) to SA on the level of
projection “expected difficult intubation” was absent
(SA-III).
SA III
lack of or
incomplete
mental model
14 A patient is scheduled for hip replacement. […] Until the use of
palacos bone cement everything went fine. […] Immediately after
inserting palacos bone cement, end-tidal CO2 drops from 37 to
13 mmHg. Oxygen saturation does not provide values. At the
beginning, a sinus tachycardia of 140 bpm is noticed, quickly
followed by deformed QRS complexes. Heart rate drops to 20 bpm.
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is initiated immediately. The working
hypotheses are air embolism, fat embolism and allergic reaction.
An unexpected deterioration due to the use of
palacos bone cement is described (SA-III). A dramatic
change of vital parameters is the basic information
(SA-I) that results in a re-evaluation of the situation.
As a consequence, the anesthesiologist comprehends
that cardiopulmonary resuscitation is required (SA-II).
Additionally, based on basic information, possible
causes are discussed.
SA III
over-projection
of current
trends
15 A geriatric patient with dementia is transported to the
emergency department. He has a visible laceration on the head
after having fallen out of the bed. The laceration was sutured and
a CT scan ordered in face of increasing somnolence. “A medical
student saw that nobody had placed a cervical collar and that the
patient complaint about pain when the head was positioned for
suturing. He did not communicate his observation […]. The scan
showed a facture of atlas and axis.”
There are relevant cues that indicate the possibility of
a lesion of the cervical spine (fall, laceration on head,
increasing somnolence, pain during movement of
the head). The reporting individual emphasizes that
the team did not comprehend the possibility of a
spine lesion that is, they either did not possess over
the mental model that allowed for meaningful
integration of the information mentioned above (SA-
II) or they simply did not perceive some piece of
SA I
failure to
observe
SA II
Schulz et al. BMC Anesthesiology  (2016) 16:4 Page 6 of 10
Discussion
Quantitative reports about the frequency of SA errors in
health care have been absent so far. This study provides
evidence that SA errors are frequent in those critical in-
cidents cases that were reported voluntarily in a CIRS.
This is in accordance with findings from aviation where
the frequency of SA problems in operational errors
ranged between 59 % and 88 % [15]. In this exploratory
approach, the frequency of SA errors and the distribu-
tion between the SA levels did not differ significantly be-
tween anesthesia, ICU, PACU and others. Furthermore,
it was independent from the estimated frequency, pro-
fessional status and experience of the reporting individ-
ual. Only in a minority of cases with critical incident
(18.5 %), no critical action was identified or tracing
down from a critical action to an associated SA error
was not possible. Several other studies in health care
qualitatively examined the role of SA in different settings
such as during diagnostic errors in primary care [16], in
nurses during medication administration [17] and during
object transfer in the operating theatre [18], and the
interdisciplinary management of patient risk in inpatient
settings [19]. However, no study provided quantitative
data about the frequency of SA errors in any setting so
far.
In contrast to an analysis of 143 incidents reported in
the voluntary Aviation Safety Reporting System (76.3 %
SA level I errors, 20.3 % SA level II errors and 3.4 % SA
Table 2 Fifteen examples of SA errors (Continued)
information, e.g., pain during movement of the neck
(SA-I).
Another point refers to a lack of communication as
the medical student did not speak up (Team SA).
Communication can refer to the SA level of
comprehension (e.g., “we cannot rule out a spinal
lesion, therefore cervical collar makes sense”) or to
the level of perception (e.g., “every time the patients
head/spine is moved, the patient complaints about
pain”).
missing mental
model
TEAM SA
Fifteen cases during which SA errors led to errors or near misses. SA-I refers to the level of perception, SA-II to the level of comprehension, SA-III to the level of
projection, respectively
Table 3 Three Examples of re-established SA
Case
number
Case description Analysis from the SA perspective
16 “The nurse brings red blood cell [RBC] concentrate into the OR. During
check we noticed that the RBC data sheet does not match the patient
(same blood group, wrong patient). […] The nurse had to care for too
many OR so that she did not check for patient’s name.”
Although the mismatch had been identified just before transfusion,
the reporting individual claims that there was a failure to perceive
important data when taking the RBCs out of the fridge (SA-I).
According to the report, this was caused by excessive workload.
Another check prevented from possibly negative consequences.
17 “Intubation with a double-lumen tube after visualizing the glottis. Dur-
ing bag ventilation, no end-tidal CO2 was measured. Assuming
bronchial obstruction, forceful attempts to inflate the lungs results in
small oscillations of the CO2 curve. […] Bronchoscopy by the attending
called in reveals esophageal intubation. Meanwhile, SpO2 had dropped.
A single-lumen tube was placed for oxygenation and after a few mi-
nutes, this was replaced by a double-lumen tube using tracheal tube
introducer without problems.”
After a normal intubation, there is no end-tidal CO2. As this combin-
ation of basic data is contradicting (and therefore not compre-
hended, SA-II), a re-evaluation including the search for additional
information (bronchoscopy) is prompted (SA-I) with the aim for un-
derstanding the situation.
After getting SA on the comprehension level (SA-II), the
anesthesiologist decides to preferably use a single-lumen tube for
safe oxygenation in order to avoid on-going intubation difficulties
(SA-III).
18 […] Due to respiratory distress, the patient was intubated. […] During
a transport for CT scan of the thorax, the patient became
haemodynamically unstable requiring an increasing dosage of
noradrenaline. The initial scan showed pneumothorax corresponding to
the clinical assessment. There was the indication for placing a drain
quickly. During puncture, the patient developed a haemodynamically
highly relevant tension pneumothorax (HR > 180 bpm, blood pressure
90/40 with noradrenaline). Unfortunately, the needles available were
not sufficiently long and thick. Therefore air was removed using a drain.
Afterwards the blood pressure stabilized but tachycardia remained, later
on switching to ventricular tachycardia. On the code-blue trolley there
was only an automated external defibrillator so that for cardioversion a
defibrillator had to be retrieved from an ICU several floors above. The
sinus rhythm, achieved thereby, improved the situation significantly
[…].
In face of deteriorating vital parameters, the team realizes that a
pneumothorax is the most probable cause following the result of
the initial scan. Before the puncture, additional basic information is
collected by a clinical assessment (assumingly auscultation) to
confirm the diagnosis.
After successful puncture, the basic data (vital parameters) change
favorably but do not reach normal values. After integrating
additional basic information on the monitor (the ECG waveform),
the diagnosis of a ventricular tachycardia (SA level II) is made and
the need for cardioversion is recognized (decision-making). As the
AED is not suitable for cardioversion (long-term memory content),
the team decides to retrieve a defibrillator from elsewhere.
Three cases where SA was re-established. SA-I refers to the level of perception, SA-II to the level of comprehension, SA-III to the level of projection, respectively
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level III errors) [7], we found less errors on the level of
perception and more errors on the levels of comprehen-
sion and projection. As errors on the SA levels II and III
necessarily involve long-term memory content for the
processing of basic data [1], this may be due to a lack of
training and experience. This is not surprising because
staffing in health care is, in contrast to commercial avi-
ation, less standardized with respect to quality and quan-
tity. Another domain-specific explanation is that both,
pilots and air traffic controllers work in highly standard-
ized settings and they always utilize the same set of in-
formation (e.g., pilots always have an altimeter available).
An anesthetist, in contrast, has to actively seek for infor-
mation (e.g., through observing the surgical field or
through communication) and must decide whether an
additional source of information (e.g., arterial line) is es-
sential for successful management of the case and
whether invasive measures are justified.
The cases for the qualitative analysis were selected
purposefully with the aim of providing examples for
each of the type of error in Endsley’s taxonomy. We
intended to demonstrate that errors on the more basic
levels obligatorily cause errors on the more advanced
levels and finally lead to wrong or missing decisions that
in turn compromise patient safety or even cause patient
harm. This relationship was reflected by cases where
wrong decisions base on a lack of SA and cases in which
SA abilities in dynamic situations resulted in adequate
management of a problem. In this sample, the taxonomy
was suitable for providing mechanistic insights in the
analysis of particular cases. In one qualitative study on
diagnostic errors in primary care, the SA framework was
also found to be useful for a descriptive evaluation [16].
An important pre-condition, however, for breaking
down the causality from critical action to decision-
making and further to SA with types of errors on the
respective SA levels, was that the reports had to be de-
tailed enough. That was seldom the case and is also
reflected by the fact that the a priori accordance of the
raters decreased with increasing depth of analysis. For
example, on the level of individuals, it can be difficult to
decide whether an error occurred due to the missing ar-
terial line (information not available, perception) or
whether the error occurred due to the decision not to
place an arterial line (incomplete, an incorrect or an ab-
sent mental model, comprehension or projection). On the
level of teams, the reports were not detailed enough to
detect possibly missing team interactions such as SA
cross-checking. Therefore, this approach does not neces-
sarily cover ineffective teamwork where SA is considered
to be an important determinant for performance [20].
For that purpose, other databases are required. Finally,
our approach only identified one individual SA error per
case, specifically the error which led to a wrong decision
and consequently to the critical action. As even one sin-
gle SA error can be multifactorial, this is not in contrast
to Reason who used the Swiss cheese model to illustrate
that often more than one defense barrier has to fail be-
fore an error occurs [10]. In this context it is important
to remark that in our study the SA construct was used
to analyze SA errors that occur in individuals rather
than to analyze SA errors that are caused by individuals.
In hindsight it is easy to determine which SA the indi-
vidual should have possessed as “people holding a false
belief do not know it is false” [21]. To prevent the indi-
viduals from being blamed, however, it is imperative to
assess the information available in the respective situ-
ation and the conditions under which the individual
worked. Furthermore, the individual’s long-term memory
content and the extent to which it is available for data
processing, e.g., under conditions of high workload, has
to be considered. Long-term memory content is integral
for building SA on the levels II and III and cannot be in-
fluenced by the individuals in course of a critical inci-
dent [1]. Obviously, this concept is helpful for a better
understanding of decision-making but, in the far major-
ity of cases, it does not allow for drawing conclusions
with regard to the individual’s responsibility to gain and
maintain accurate SA [21, 22].
There is a large body of literature about human errors.
Reason promoted a paradigm change when he suggested
shifting the focus from the individual to the system, in
order to continuously improve the conditions under
which humans work and thus, to reduce errors and en-
hance reliability in health care [10]. Another important
step was to systematically analyze the frequency and
quality of critical incidents, the first among them the
Closed Claims Project of the American Society of Anes-
thesiologists [23] and the Australian Critical Incident
Monitoring Study [12]. Both have led to a number of
changes in daily practice [24]. Two recent interventions,
a new drug administration system [25] and the World
Health Organization’s Surgical Safety Checklist [26], re-
sulted in reduced mortality and adverse events. In our
view both interventions intend to enhance SA: The drug
administration system provides additional auditory input
on the level of perception, includes cognitive aids (e.g., it
remembers to administer antibiotics within 15 min after
skin incision) and intends to reduce workload by an
electronic health record, which permits observing the
patient more intensively [25]. The Surgical Safety Check-
list promotes Team SA by forcing communication
through a standardized form [1, 26].
Some important limitations are inherent to any analysis
based on CIRS. Evidently, the reports are of limited length,
reported chronologically, and explanatory elements often
limit to the medical and technical context. Accordingly,
reporting individuals rarely consider human elements
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such as non-technical skills. Recently, Haller et al. re-
ported clinical factors that were associated with non-use
of the system such as regional anesthesia, emergency pro-
cedures and severe complications with a high risk of litiga-
tion [27]. Furthermore, there are hindering factors such as
the individual’s role in an incident, and a lack of safety cul-
ture on the individual as well as on the institutional level.
Not all hospitals and departments agree to publish their
cases. Additionally, with the aim of ensuring the reporter’s
and patient’s anonymity, in some cases the CIRS
personnel may be forced to delete also important informa-
tion including whether or the extent to which a patient
may have been harmed. Taken all together, in case-to-case
decisions, only a minority of the real critical incidents is
published in CIRS and therefore, the results are not a valid
picture of the real quality and quantity of critical incidents.
Nevertheless, in face of the frequency of SA errors in this
subsample and the possibility to mechanistically describe
their consequences, the authors suggest that the SA
framework is a promising approach to enhance our know-
ledge about the development of human error in health
care. However, more representative databases are re-
quired. For the SA framework, it still has to be shown that
the approach of analyzing incidents is suitable to 1) sys-
tematically and completely detect causal relationships
between SA, decision-making and performance, 2) to
identify factors that contribute to these SA errors, and 3)
to derive promising interventions that successfully address
frequent sources of SA errors.
Another technique designed to develop a thorough
understanding of domain-specific SA requirements and
cognitive decision-making processes is the Goal-
Directed Task Analysis [28]. It is a form of cognitive task
analysis that focuses on individual’s goals, decisions, and
information requirements that support those goals and
decisions. Based thereupon, future promising steps in-
clude the development of more user-centered monitor-
ing systems that, for example, integrate basic data in
order to provide information that directly enhances indi-
viduals’ SA on the more advanced levels [29], e.g., by
suggesting a diagnosis. In some locations, structural al-
terations that not only address the availability of but also
the use of monitoring systems may be a relatively easy
first step. Last but not least, new training approaches
should be directed to foster the individual skills needed
for developing SA adequately and quickly.
Conclusion
In conclusion, SA errors are very frequent in critical in-
cidents reported in the German CIRS for anesthesia and
critical care. The SA framework is suitable to provide
mechanistic insights into the development of critical in-
cidents. However, prior to identifying promising inter-
ventions for the reduction of SA errors, further robust
analysis tools and representative databases for the health
care system are required.
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